A critical analysis of the United Nations Organisation mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo : a focus on MONUC by Zvobgo, Tafadzwa
University of cape Town 
Faculty of Humanities 
Department of Political Studies 
2012 
POL SOlOW 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION MISSION IN 
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: A FOCUS ON MONUC 
A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of 














The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 












This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any 
degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this 
dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been 
cited and referenced according to the Turbian/Chicago citation style. 
Signature:, _________________ Date:, _______ _ 
2 
Acknowledgments 
I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Annette Seegers, for her 
valuable advice, guidance and insight. J would also like to thank my family and friends for 
their encouragement and support. 
3 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgments ..................................................................................................................... 3 
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................ 6 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 8 
Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................... 10 
1.1 Problem Statement ........................................................................................................ 10 
1.2 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 11 
1.3 MONUC in the Context of United Nations Peace Operations ....................................... 12 
1.4 Concepts ......................................................................................................................... 16 
1.4.1 Peacekeeping .......................................................................................................... 16 
1.4.2 Mandate .................................................................................................................. 16 
1.4.3 Objectives ............................................................................................................... 16 
1.5 Chapter Outline .............................................................................................................. 17 
1.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 18 
Chapter 2: Uterature Review ................................................................................................... 19 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 19 
2.2 Failures of Peacekeeping Operations ............................................................................ 19 
2.2.1 Mandates ................................................................................................................ 20 
2.2.2 Logistical Issues and Resource Problems ................................................................ 23 
2.2.3 The Misconduct of Peacekeepers ........................................................................... 2 4 
2.2.4 Peace Agreements .................................................................................................. 26 
2.3 Responding to MONUC's Failures .................................................................................. 27 
2.4 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 29 
Chapter 3: The DRC, the 1998 Conflict and the United Nations In the DRC .......................... 31 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 31 
3.2 The 1998 ORC Conflict .................................................................................................... 31 
3.2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 31 
3.2.2 The Rwandan Genocide .......................................................................................... 33 
3.2.3 Rebel Groups ........................................................................................................... 34 
3.2.4 Natural Resources ................................................................................................... 36 
3.2.5 The Land .................................................................................................................. 38 
3.2.6 Questions over Citizenship and Identity ................................................................. 39 
3.3 Peacemaking .................................................................................................................. 41 
4 
3.4 The United Nations in the DRC ...................................................................................... 43 
3.4.1 MONUCJs Mandate ................................................................................................. 44 
3.5 The Current Status in the DRC ....................................................................................... 47 
3.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 48 
Chapter 4: MONUC's Mandates, Objectives and Accomplishments 1999 - 2010 ................. 49 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 49 
4.2 MONUC 1999 - 2002 ...................................................................................................... 49 
4.2.1 Mandates ................................................................................................................ 49 
4.2.2 MONUCJs Objectives ............................................................................................... 52 
4.2.3 MONUCs Implementation of Objectives ............................................................... 53 
Observing and Monitoring ........................................................................................... 53 
Protection of Civilians .................................................................................................. 53 
4.2.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 54 
4.3 MONUC 2002 - 2004 ...................................................................................................... 55 
4.3.1 Mandates ................................................................................................................ 55 
4.3.2 MONUCJs Objectives ............................................................................................... 58 
4.3.3 MONUC's Implementation of Objectives ............................................................... 59 
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes ................................................................................. 59 
" Protection of Civilians .................................................................................................. 59 
4.3.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 61 
4.4 MONUC 2004 - 2006 ...................................................................................................... 62 
4.4.1 Mandates ................................................................................................................ 62 
4.4.2 MONUCJs Objectives ............................................................................................... 63 
4.4.3 MONUC's Implementation of Objectives ............................................................... 64 
Elections ....................................................................................................................... 64 
Use of Force ................................................................................................................. 65 
4.4.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 66 
4.5 MONUC 2007 - 2010 ...................................................................................................... 67 
4.5.1 Mandates ................................................................................................................ 67 
4.5.2 MONUCJs Objectives ............................................................................................... 69 
4.5.3 MONUC's Implementation of Objectives ............................................................... 70 
Security Sector Reform ................................................................................................ 70 
Conflict Management in the Eastern DRC ................................................................... 72 
Civilian Protection ........................................................................................................ 74 
The local Election Process ........................................................................................... 75 
4.5.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 75 
4.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 76 
Chapter 5: Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 78 








































Allied Democratic Forces 
Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire 
National Council for the Defence of Democracy/Forces for the 
Defence of Democracy 
National Congress for the Defence of the People 
Disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and 
reintegration 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
European Union 
European Union-International Emergency Multinational Force 
European Union Force in the DRC 
EU Police Mission in the DRC 
EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC 
European Security and Defence Policy 
Rwanda Armed Forces 
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Front for the Integration and Peace in Ituri 
Nationalist and Integrationist Front/Patriotic Force of Resistance in 
Ituri 
Inter-Congolese Dialogue 
International Crisis Group 
Internally Displaced Persons 
International non-governmental organisation 
Joint Military Commission 
Joint Verification Mechanism 
Lord's Resistance Army 
Congo Liberation Movement 
United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC 
United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC 
Memorandum of Understanding 
Nongovernmental Organisation 
United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services 
Patriots in the Congolese Resistance 
Party for the Safeguarding of the Congo 
Congolese Rally for Democracy 
Congolese Rally for Democracy - Goma 
Congolese Rally for Democracy - Kisangani 
Congolese Rally for Democracy - Movement for Liberation 
Congolese Rally for Democracy - National 











Rwandan Patriotic Front 
Southern African Development Community 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
Security Sector Reform 
Troop Contributing Country 
United Nations 
United Nations Security Council 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 
Uganda's People's Congress 
7 
Abstract 
Critical discussions on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations are primarily failure-
focused and seek to reform those operations, thus limiting the literature about 
peacekeeping and its results. This dissertation intends to expand the scope of inquiry into 
UN peacekeeping operations by critically analysing the United Nations Organisation Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUq. It accomplishes this by examining how 
MONUCs United Nation Security Council mandates and objectives (its prioritisation and 
interpretation of mission mandates) impacted the mission. In addition, it includes an 
examination of MONUCs accomplishments. 
The dissertation reveals that there were key problems with the MONUC mandates as 
formulated by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR). The mandates 
lacked clarity; were too many for the mission to implement effectively; and, at times, caused 
the mission to operate at a level outside its capacity and capability. Furthermore, there 
were problems with the mission's objectives. Firstly, MONUC's prioritisation of issues led 
the mission to neglect addressing other United Nations Security Council (UNSq objectives 
such as the instability in the eastern Congo. Secondly, mandates were mostly developed in 
cooperation with the Congolese government, a government known for its corruption. Thus, 
any collaborative exercises with this government were compromised. 
The key findings of this dissertation are that the mission produced better results when it 
focused on a central goal, as it did in the preparation for the elections from 2004 to 2006 as 
opposed to its relatively passive approaches from 1999 to 2004. In addition, in certain 
instances, how MONUC interpreted its mandates and used Its resources had more of an 
impact on the mission's accomplishments than did the amount of resources MONUC had 
and whether or not MONUC could use force or protect civilians. 
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MONUC's accomplishments should not be overlooked. Despite the weakness of the 
Congolese government, MONUC's difficulty in protecting civilians, and continued instability 
in the eastern Congo, MONUC successfully contributed to the 2006 election process and the 
stabilisation of the greater Congolese area. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
After 'Africa's First World War' erupted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in August 
19981, the United Nations (UN) deployed the United Nations Organisation Mission in the 
DRC (MONUC).2 This dissertation analyses the MONUC peacekeeping mission, particularly its 
mandate, objectives and the operations undertaken from 1999 to 2010. I ask two major 
questions: 
What were MONUC's mandates and objectives? 
and 
To what extent did MONUC accomplish its objectives? 
Most scholarly discussions on UN peace operations are concerned with identifying 'the 
causes and nature of conflict and assessing - in instrumental terms - the efficacy of 
alternative strategies for peace and the experiences of particular operations,.3 Though these 
1 In this dissertation, the names Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Congo will be used Interchangeably 
to refer to the country. 
2 MONUC was renamed the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUSCO) as of 1 July 2010, In order to adapt its capabilities to allow the mission to deal with the new phase 
of peace and consolidation in the DRC and exit strategy for the UN as of 1 April 2010. This paper will be 
examining the MONUC mission only. 
United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1925 S/RES/1925 (2010)," 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010) (accessed October 5, 2010); United 
Nations, "The Thirty-first Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
DRC,N http:Uwww.un.org/ga/search/vlew doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/164 (accessed October 5,2010). 
3 AlexJ. Bellamy, "The 'Next Stage' In Peace Operations Theoryr International Peacekeeping 11, 1 (2004): 1. 
These discussions can be found In the following sources: Tatlana Carayannls and Herbert F. Weiss, "The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1996-2002, H in Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Notions and 
Regional Organizations, ed. Jane Boulden (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 253-304; Jakkie ClIIiers and 
Mark Malan, Peacekeeping in the DRC: MONUC and the Rood to Peace (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 
2001); Emeric Rogier, ''The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: A Critical Overview, N in Challenges of Peace 
Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ed. Mark Malan and Jo~o Gomes 
Porto (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 25-42; Paul D. Williams, "Peace Operations in Africa: 
Seven Challenges, any Solutions," ACCORD: Conflict Trends 3 (2009). 
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discussions provide useful explanations and descriptions of the missions' accomplishments 
and challenges, these studies usually limit their analysis of UN operations to the existing 
ends, means, and forms of UN operations. This is because much of the literature 'devotes 
too much attention to 'policy relevance' or the goal of offering advice and 
recommendations to policy makers' or identifying lessons to learn.4 The inevitable result is 
that inquiries into UN peace operations are limited to reformist lessons. 
This dissertation, in contrast, aims to contribute to the study of UN peacekeeping 
operations through a critical approach. This approach includes evaluation of the normative 
underpinnings of the operations, as well as of the organisations that conduct operations.s 
The benefit of analysing normative assumptions of and within peace operations is that a 
better or at least more balanced understanding of UN peace operations can be developed.6 
1.2 Methodology 
This dissertation is a case study because it is concerned with 'understanding and explaining 
the complexities ... and underlying values,7 of one UN peace operation, namely, the MONUC 
peacekeeping operation in the Congo. MONUC presents a valuable perspective on UN peace 
operations because of its formation, duration and expenses: the operation proved to be the 
most expensive (incurring approximately US$ 1 billion per year); the largest (up to 20 000 
troops); and the longest-running (11 years) UN operation in the world.s 
4 Roland Paris, "Broadening the Study of Peace Operations," International Studies Review 2,3 (2000): 28. 
S Bellamy, "The 'Next Stage'," 19. 
6 Paris, "Broadening the Study," 29. 
7 Roger Pierce, Research Methods in Politics: A Practical Guide {london: SAGE Publications ltd, 2008),45. 
8 United Nations, "Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 
2010 A/C.5/64/15," http://www.un.orli!/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=A!C.5/64/15 (accessed March 18, 
2011). 
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The case study research method is defined as 'an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident,.9 Because this 
dissertation deals with a single case, the analysis of MONUC cannot be equated With other 
UN peace operations. lO This dissertation's conclusions can, however, contribute to a better 
understanding of peace operations: the dissertation is, in other words, a 'theory' -generating 
case study.ll 
The dissertation does not attempt to propose policy advice, identify lessons to learn from 
the mission or propose new approaches for UN peacekeeping in the Congo.12 
The information of this dissertation is primarily qualitative, drawing on primary and 
secondary Information. These include articles, books, journals, newspaper articles, NGO-
reports, UN reports and internet sources. 
1.3 MONUC in the Context of United Nations Peace Operations 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) gave MONUC the necessary legal empowerment 
to promote peace and security in the Congo through the authorisation of United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) or mandates.13 The basis of all UNSC authorisations for 
peacekeeping missions is the Charter of the United Nations.14 Although not specifically 
stated in the Charter, peacekeeping operations are normally ordered by the UNSC under 
Cha pter VI, VII or VIII of the Charter, depending on the needs of the deployments' zone. is 
9 Robert K. Yin, Case study research: Design and Methods (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2009), 17. 
10 Yin, Case study research, 18. 
11 PariS, IIBroadening the Study," 32. 
12 Bellamy, "The 'Next Stage'," 18. 
13 United Nations, "MONUC Mandate," 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/mon uc/mandate.shtml (accessed March 29, 2011). 
14 United Nations, "MONUC Mandate." 
15 United Nations, "Mandates and the Legal Basis for Peacekeeping," 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operatlons/pkmandates.shtmI (accessed January 24, 2012). 
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'However, the Security Council need not refer to a specific Chapter of the Charter when 
passing a resolution authorizing the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation.'16 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter on the 'Pacific Settlements of Disputes' permits operations to 
'investigate any dispute, or any which might lead to international friction or give rise to a 
dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely 
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security',l7 At the same time, this 
chapter authorises a mission to encourage the settlement of disputes 'through negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, [through] regional agencies 
or arrangements, or other peaceful means',lS 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter is concerned with 'Action with Respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression',I9 Chapter VII permits a peace 
operation to take military action or use force when necessary to maintain peace and 
encourage stability and security,20 
UN peacekeeping, according to Chapter VI of the UN Charter, adheres to three key 
principles: 
the consent of the main parties involved in the deployment zone; 
operating impartially; and 
16 United Nations, "Mandates and the Legal Basis," 
17 United Nations, IICharter of the United Nations: Chapter 6," 
http:Uwww,un,org!enldocumentslcharterlchaoter6,shtml (accessed September 14, 2011). 
18 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 6." 
19 United Nations, IICharter ofthe United Nations: Chapter 7," 
http://www,un.org/enldocumentslcharterlchapter7.shtml (accessed September 14, 2011). 
20 United Nations, "Charter ofthe United Nations: Chapter 7." 
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not using force except in instances of self-defence, protecting civilians and defence 
of the mandate 'particularly in situations where the State is unable to provide 
security and maintain pubiic order'.21 
The non-use of force principle is the most controversial in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping 
operations are allowed to use force only when authorised .to do so by the UNSC and with 
the consent of the main parties in the conflict.22 'Although on the ground they may 
sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace 
enforcement, as envisaged under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter:23 Peace 
enforcement operations differ from peacekeeping missions in that they do not require the 
consent of the main parties of the conflict to use military force. 
MONUC peacekeeping not only aims at implementing peace and security in the Congo by 
containing hostilities or implementing respective peace agreements, but also promotes 
political reform through elections; encourages the rule of law; protection of human rights 
and civilians; promotes security sector reform (SSR) through disarmament, demobilisation, 
repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) of former combatants; and the 
training of govemment forces?4 These aspects are not found in the traditional definition of 
peacekeeping. This form of peacekeeping, which incorporates aspects outside of what is 
considered traditional, is known as multidimensional peacekeeping. The MONUC 
peacekeeping mission is thus a multidimensional peacekeeping operation. The main 
activities of a UN multidimensional peacekeeping operation are to: 
21 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Peace and Security," 
http:Uwww.un.orglen/peacekeeping!operatlons/peace.shtml (accessed July 5, 2011). 
22 United Nations Peacekeeping, NPrindples of United Nations Peacekeeping," 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/Drlnciples.shtml (accessed July 5, 2011). 
23 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Principles of United Nations." 
24 United Nations Peacekeeping, "What is Peacekeeping?" 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml (accessed July 5, 2011). 
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a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State's 
ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human 
rights; 
b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation 
and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of 
governance; and 
c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other 
international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent 
and coordinated manner.25 
Most UN peacekeeping operations' mandates contain a degree of consistency in the tasks 
mandated in their resolutions.26 These are to: 
• Deploy forces to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of 
conflict across borders; 
• Stabilise conflict situations after a ceasefire in order to create a 
conducive environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace 
agreement; 
• Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements; and 
• Lead states or territories through a transition to a stable government, 
based on democratic principles, good governance and economic 
development.27 
UN peacekeeping operations, like MONUC, can also be mandated to support peace building 
activities such as disarmament, de mobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants; mine 
action; SSR and other rule of law-related activities; the protection and promotion of human 
25 United Nations Peacekeeping, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines," 
http://www.un.org/ga/search{view doc.asp?symbol=S{2010{164 (accessed July 5,2011). 
26 United Nations, "Mandates and the Legal Basis." 
27 United Nations, "Mandates and the Legal Basis." 
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rights; electoral assistance; support for the restoration and extension of State authority; and 
the promotion of social and economic recovery and development.28 
1.4 Concepts 
1.4.1 Peacekeeping 
Peacekeeping here is defined as 
lthe deployment of international military and civilian personnel to a conflict 
area with the consent of the parties to the conflict in order to: stop or 
contain hostilities or supervise the carrying out of a peace agreement,.29 
1.4.2 Mandate 
In this dissertation, mandates are defined as the tasks, activities and operations that 
MONUC Is called to and expected to implement on the ground. MONUC obtains the 
authorisation to implement these mandates from the United Nations Security Council 
through the authorisation of UNSCRs.30 
1.4.3 Objectives 
The United Nations Security Council normally authorises a large number of tasks to a 
mission at a time. This makes it difficult and impractical for a mission to address each issue 
with equal weight. As a result, peacekeeping missions prioritise mandates according to the 
2B United Nations, "Mandates and the Legal Basis." 
29 United Nations Association in Canada, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Definition." 
http://www.unac.orglpeacekeeping!enlun-peacekeeping/definitionI (accessed July 5,2011). 
30 United Nations, "MONUC Mandate." 
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perceived need on the ground. For the discussion of this dissertation, MONUC's objectives 
are defined as the mandates that the mission prioritised during a specified period. despite 
the full list of authorised UNSCRs. 
1.S Chapter Outline 
The dissertation consists of five chapters: 
The discussion in this first chapter determines the parameters of this study and defines the 
key concepts utilised in it. These concepts are peacekeeping, mandate and objectives. 
The second chapter contains a literature review that evaluates the academic literature that 
is pertinent to the study. 
The third chapter contains a brief historical background of the UN in the Congo, an overview 
of the events that led to the formation of the MONUC peacekeeping operation, and a brief 
outline of that operation. It also provides a brief historical background to the 1998 
Congolese conflict and delineates the features of the conflict that continued to have an 
impact on the country during the MONUC peacekeeping operation. 
The fourth chapter analyses the mission's mandates and objectives. It also examines 
MONUC's accomplishments. It critically assesses all these factors in four consecutive 
timelines from 1999 to 2002, 2002 to 2004, 2004 to 2006, and 2007 to 2010. The chapter, 
thus, effectively ensures that any shifts in the dynamics that played out in the Congo and 
MONUC's peacekeeping are reflected in the analysis. 
The fifth chapter concludes the dissertation. 
17 
1.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this dissertation is to contribute insights into UN peace operations. It intends on 
accomplishing this by critically analysing the MONUC peacekeeping mission, particularly its 
mandate, objectives and accomplishments from 1999 to 2010. Though there are limitations 
to this study, it aims to contribute to scholarly discussions on UN peacekeeping and 
MONUC. A review of existing critiques on the MONUC peacekeeping mission is, however, 
required for this study to make informed contributions to the literature on UN 
peacekeeping. A literature review thus follows in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUq has 
inspired a significant amount of writing. Some of these use MONUC as a window on UN 
peacekeeping operations in general; others focus on only MONUC. This chapter analyses 
both of these sets of writing. 
2.2 Failures of Peacekeeping Operations 
A fair amount of the studies on UN peace operations set out to examine UN peacekeeping 
operations' failures, for example: Jane Boulden; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis; 
and Dennis C. Jett.31 Only a few studies are concerned with successful peacekeeping 
operations. These include studies by Donald C. F. Daniel, Bradd C. Hayes and Jean Kresno; 
Michael W. Doyle; Ian Johnstone and Robert C. Orr; and lise Morje Howard.32 
MONUC is often used as a case study within failure-focused UN studies. MONUC's failures 
are often attributed to mandates; logistical issues; troop and resource shortages; the 
weaknesses of the peace agreements; and the misconduct of peacekeepers. 
31 Jane Boulden, Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in the Congo, Somalia and Bosnia 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001); Jane Boulden, ed., Dealing with Conflict in A/rica: The United Nations 
and Regional Organizations (New York: Pal grave Macmillan, 2oo3), 305-316; Michael w. Doyle and Nicholas 
Sam banis, Making War & Bui/ding Peace: United Nations Peace Operation (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2006); Dennis C. Jett, Why Peacekeeping Falls (New York: Palgrave, 1999). 
!2 Donald C. F. Daniel, Bradd C. Hayes and Jean Krasno, eds., Leveraging for Success In United Nations Peace 
Operations (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone and Robert C. Orr, eds., Keeping 
the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and EI Salvador (cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1997); Lise Morje Howard, UN Peacekeeping In Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2oo8). 
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2.2.1 Mandates 
Most studies in this category centre their arguments on mandates as the underlying cause 
of the problems of MONUC. Alex J. Bellamy, Stuart Griffin and Paul D. Williams; Mark Malan 
and Joao Gomes Porto; and Emeric Rogier all argue that because MONUC was initiated with 
weak mandates, numerous difficulties with the mission resulted.33 One weakness, for 
example, was MONUC's limited authority to use force to protect civilians. Generally, 
enforcement capacities are not available to peacekeepers. Yet, the use of force can be 
permitted for self-defence purposes and in order to protect civilians in a more robust 
understanding of peacekeeping.34 Thus, MONUC's mandate needed to be formulated with 
peace enforcement capabilities. Adekeye Adebajo; Rene Lemarchand; and Paul D. Williams 
describe the mission's inability to use force when it was needed, protect civilians and 
address instability in the eastern Congo.35 
Severine Autesserre; Bellamyet al.; Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan; Mark Malan; and Paul D. 
Williams point out that the weaknesses in the mandates were rooted in other areas as well. 
They suggest that MONUC's peacekeeping failures reside in a lack of clarity in the mandates; 
the mandates' inability to recognise the weaknesses of the peace agreement; the mandates 
focus; and continued instability in the Congo.36 
Severine Autesserre highlights the importance of a mandate implementation sensitive to 
micro-level actors because much of the violence in the east emanates from both macro and 
33 Alex J. Bellamy, PaulO. Williams and Stuart Griffith, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2010); Mark Malan and Joiio Gomes Porto, eds., Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 25-42. 
34 Robust Peacekeeping is known as existing in Chapter 6.5 of the UN Charter. However, the Charter does not 
have a Chapter 6.5 and an explicit Chapter for peacekeeping. It is generally assumed and accepted that robust 
peacekeeping lies somewhere in between Chapter 6 and 7 of the UN Charter. United Nations, "United Nations 
Peacekeeplng," http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ (accessed September 10, 2010). 
35 Adekeye Adebajo, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan ConfliCts 
(Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2011), 94; Rene lemarchand, The Dynamics of violence in Central Africa 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 279; Williams, "Peace Operations in Africa." 
36 Bellamy, WIlliams and Griffith, Understanding Peacekeeping; Cilliers and Malan, Peacekeeping in the DRC; 
Mark Malan, "The UN 'Month of Africa': A Push for Actual Peace Efforts of a Fig leaf on the ORC," Institute for 
Security Studies 44 (2000); Williams, "Peace Operations in Africa."; PaulO. Williams, "lessons Unlearned: 
MONUC has little Success to Show," Journal of International Peace Operations 4,4 (2009): 11-14. 
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micro-level sources of violence and complexities of the war.37 Autesserre argues that 
MONUC's mandate implementation primarily focused on the macro-level, with effects 
expected to trickle down to the micro-level:38 MONUC's 'top-down' mandate 
implementation was inadequate for effectively implementing solutions on the local level in 
the Congo.39 
There are, nevertheless, numerous studies that recognise the successes of MONUC as these 
relate to mandates and objectives, for example, by Henri Boshoff; Nicola Dahrendorf; 
William Durch; Philip Roessler and John Prendagast; and Tom Woodhouse.40 
Boshoff; Dahrendorf; Roessler and Prendergast examine MONUC's mandate 
implementation concerning disarmament, de mobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and 
reintegration (DDRRR}.41 They assess the programme's activities; the problems with rebels 
refusing to disarm; and the reasons for that refusal. Boshoff; Dahrendorf; Roessler and 
37 Severine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Peacebuilding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 41-125. 
3tI Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local, 41-125. 
39 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local, 41-125. 
40 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local, 41-125; Henri Boshoff, "Overview of MONUCs Military 
Strategy and concepts of Operations," in Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, eds. Mark Malan and Joao Gomes Porto (Pretoria: Institute for Security 
Studies, 2004); Henri Boshoff, "Update on the Status of Army Integration in the DRC," Institute for Security 
Studies Situation Report (2005), 
http://dspace.cigilibrarv.org/jspujfbitstream/123456789/31300/1/050902DRC.pdf?1 (accessed February 2, 
2012); Henri Boshoff, "Blurred Vision: From Ituri to North Kivu, a Lack of Vision," Journal of International Peace 
Operations 4,4 (2009): 15-18; Henri Boshoff, Hans Hoebeke and Koen Vlassenroot, "Assessing Security Sector 
Reform and its Impact on the Kivu Provinces," Institute for Security Studies Situation Report (2008), 
httD:/Idspace.cigilibrarv.org!jspui/bitstream/123456789/31036/1/SITREPDRC261108.pdf?1 (accessed 
February 2, 2012); Nicola Dahrendorf, "MONUC and the Relevance of Coherent Mandates: the Case of the 
DRC/ in Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Mission, eds. Heiner Hangi, Vincenza Scherrer (Zurich: LIT 
Verlag MOnster, 2008), 67-102; William Durch, ed., Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations (Washington D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 229-318; Tom Woodhouse, "Peacekeeping, Peace Culture and Conflict 
Resolution," International Peacekeeping 17,4 (2010): 486-498. 
41 Boshoff, "Update on the Status."; Dahrendorf, "MONUC and the Relevance," 67-102; Philip Roessler and 
John Prendergast, "Democratic Republic ofthe Congo," in Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations, ed. William 
Durch (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 229-318. 
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Prendergast examine MONUC's mandate implementation concerning DDRRR, however, with 
limited consideration of its mandate implementation of other activities.42 
Woodhouse addresses the role of cultural issues within peacekeeping operations; his study 
identifies how 'culture and cultural analysis might be used to develop more effective and 
sustainable peacekeeping int~rventions'.43 Peacekeeping operations are criticised for failing 
to identify the crucial role of culture in deployment areas. Woodhouse points out how 
MONUC encouraged its peace and stability mandate through peace games, which were 
'held to support an atmosphere of peace and reconciliation around the elections of July and 
August 2006'.44 
The problem with the various perspectives on MONUC's mandates is, firstly, that they are 
primarily failure-focused. The authors do not provide a balanced assessment of MONUC's 
failures and achievements. Secondly, the failure-focused perspective 'is not particularly 
concerned with explanation,.45 In other words, these studies make limited efforts to 
discover the underlying explanations for the failures. It is not enough to state, for example, 
that the mandate needed or lacked enforcement capabilities: it is important to consider why 
it did not.46 Thirdly, while the focus on one part of the mandate is valid, it should be 
conceded that no multi-functional UN mandate can realistically address all of the mandates 
authorised to it. Leaders of a mission inevitably rank a mandate's various objectives. But one 
finds few studies assessing MONUC's actual priorities (or objectives). Finally, the literature 
42 Boshoff, ttUpdate on the Status."; Dahrendorf, "MONUC and the Relevance/' 67-102; Roessler and 
Prendergast, "Democratic Republic of the Congo," 229-318. 
43 Woodhouse, "Peacekeeping, Peace Culture," 486. 
44 Woodhouse, "Peacekeeping, Peace Culture," 495. 
4S Virginia Page Fortna and lise Morje Howard, "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping literature,H The 
Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 287. 
46 Fortna and Howard, "Pitfalls and Prospects/II 284. 
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rarely considers the overall effectiveness of the operation. For example, was the Congo 
better off with MONUC or without it?47 
2.2.2 Logistical Issues and Resource Problems 
Many studies on MONUC peacekeeping argue that the size ofthe ORC and the complexity of 
the Congolese conflict - involving at least twelve armed rebel groups and nine African 
countries - required a large and well-resourced mission to be effective. Adebajo; Boulden; 
and Cilliers and Malan suggest that the weaknesses of the MONUC operation were partly 
due to logistical problems; insufficient troop strength; and financial resources.48 Boulden 
argues that the UN's unwillingness to commit resources, especially at the start of 
peacekeeping operations, affected the missions' credibility and thus increased the likelihood 
of failure.49 Many other authors simply argue that it was because of inadequate finanCial 
resources and an insufficient number of troops, equipment etc., that the peacekeepers 
were unable to accomplish their tasks satisfactorily.5o 
Logistical weaknesses, shortages of resources and troops were serious problems within the 
MONUC operation. Why these shortages existed is rarely considered, except by Roessler 
and Prendergast; and Tobias C. Berkman and Victoria K. Holt.51 There is also limited 
consideration in the literature of how MONUC used its resources. This could have had more 
of an impact on the mission than the quantity of available resources. 
47 Virginia Page Fortna's 2008 study is an example of where overall effectiveness is considered. She rarely 
mentions MONUC. Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil 
War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
48 Adebajo, United Nations Peacekeeping, 93-94; Boulden, Dealing with Conflict in Africa; Cilliers and Malan, 
Peacekeeping in the ORe. 
49 Boulden, Dealing with Conflict in Africa, 253-304. 
50 Jane Boulden, "Mandates Matter: An Exploration of Impartiality in United Nations Operations," Global 
Governance 11, 2 (2005): 147-160. ( 
Sl Victoria K. Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, The Responsibility 
to Protect and Modern Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Henry l Stimson Center, 2006), 159; Philip Roessler 
and John Prendergast, "Democratic Republic of the Congo, N 249-254 and 256-259. 
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2.2.3 The Misconduct of Peacekeepers 
Some MONUC peacekeepers failed to maintain high professional standards. These troops 
took advantage of the collapsed societies and fragile communities and committed crimes 
against communities, women and children.52 These crimes included: the theft of property 
and natural resources (gold, diamonds etc.); illegal arms trading; sexual exploitation and 
abuse (SEA); and human trafficking. MONUC peacekeepers, who were meant to protect, 
assist and 'do no harm,53 had become abusers, scoundrels and thieves. 
A few studies pursue the allegations of the peacekeeper's participation in the illegal arms 
trade and theft of valuable resources. For example, Martin Plaut described how Pakistani 
UN peacekeeping troops were illegally dealing directly with the Nationalist and 
Integrationist Front {FNI} militia group, together with the Congolese army and Indian traders 
from Kenya.54 He argues that there was reliable evidence revealing that MONUC 
peacekeepers were illegally trading with the FNI militia group by giving the confiscated arms 
(confiscated during the DDRRR programmes) for gold that the militia group had illegally 
extracted.55 Plaut maintains that MONUC peacekeepers contributed to the instability in the 
country by participating in the illegal arms and mineral trade.56 
52 Ray Murphy, "An Assessment of UN Efforts to Address Sexual Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel," 
International Peacekeeping 13, 4 (2007): 531-546. 
53 The term 'do no harm' is associated with Mary Anderson's approach to identifying the negative effects of 
humanitarian aid. She puts forward recommendations aimed at improving the delivery of humanitarian aid 
and development assistance for the Nongovernmental Organisation (NGO) world. 'Do no harm' is recognised 
as a contemporary theoretical approach useful for analyzing and explaining unintended consequences during 
peace operations in Chiyuki AOi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur, eds., Unintended Consequences of 
Peacekeeping (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2007), 16-17; Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can 
Support Peace or War (London: Lynne Rlenner, 1999). 
54 Martin Plaut, "Trading Guns for Gold: Pakistani Peacekeepers in the Congo," Briefings, Review of African 
Political Economy 34, 113 (2007): 580-588. 
S5 Plaut, "Trading Guns for Gold." 
56 Plaut, "Trading Guns for Gold."; Martin Plaut, "UN Troops 'Traded Guns for Gold'," 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6681457.stm (accessed August 3, 2010); Martin Plaut, "UN Troops 'helped 
smuggle Gold'," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil6941480.stm (accessed August 3,2010). 
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Ayesha Siddiqa ascribed the involvement in theft and illegal arms trade to soldiers' poor 
remuneration packages from their home governments.57 She uses the example of Pakistani 
troops to show how this was the case and argues that these troops became involved in 
criminal activities during peace operations because their government remunerated them 
inadequately.58 Illegal trading became another means through which the peacekeepers 
could earn 'an economic advantage from a foreign posting'.59 
Studies that examining MONUC's SEA are more extensive, perhaps because the sexual 
abuse of civilians in the Congo has attracted considerable attention. Studies often described 
the abuses committed and the lack of accountability measures, attributing MONUC 
peacekeepers' SEA misconduct to poor training, ineffective diSciplinary deterrents, and a 
legal framework within which peacekeepers were protected.60 Examples of these studies 
include those by Lauren Hunter; Vanessa Kent; Ray Murphy; Susan A. Notar; and Sarah W. 
Spencer. 
One case of, for example, SEA, is more than we should tolerate and thus, the discussion of 
MONUC peacekeepers' misconduct is valid. Yet this focus has had a tendency to divert 
attention from MONUC's accomplishments (positive or negative) to the peacekeepers' 
misconduct. 
57 Plaut, ''Trading Guns for Gold," 588; Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy 
(london: Pluto Press, 2007). 
58 Plaut, "Trading Guns for Gold."; Siddiqa, Military Inc. 
59 Plaut, ''Trading Guns for Gold."; Siddiqa, Military Inc. 
60 lauren Hunter, "Should We Prosecute the Protectors? Holding Peacekeepers Accountable in Cases of Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse," Carleton Review of International Affairs 1 (2009): 15-34. 
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2.2.4 Peace Agreements 
UN protocol acknowledges that peacekeeping requires good peacemaking: there must be 
'peace to keep' to enable UN military personnel to effectively assist in implementing peace 
agreements.61 Numerous authors centre their studies on the relationship between peace 
agreements and peacekeeping in the Congo. Bellamy et al.; Cilliers and Malan; Rogier; and 
Williams recognise the effect of the peace agreements on the environment for a 
peacekeeping operation.62 These authors attribute difficulties and instability in the DRC to 
the peace agreements' weaknesses. 
Bellamy et al. reveal how the weaknesses of the lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999 made 
it difficult for the peacekeepers to keep the peace.63 They argue that continued instability 
prevailed because of the liaison officers' failure to identify severe ceasefire violations; a lack 
of commitment from the signatories; and the exclusion of armed belligerents from the 
agreement.64 This argument is in line with Stephen John Stedman's famous analysis and 
identification of 'spoilers', whom he defines as 'Signatories to [a] peace agreement who fail 
to fulfill key obligations to the agreement or non-signatories (belligerents and rebels) who 
are excluded from the peace process or who exclude themselves and use violence to attack 
the peace process,.65 These spoilers cause major disruptions during the peace process. 
Bellamy et al. recognise the spoilers in the DRC scenario as both excluded belligerents and 
those signatories that lacked commitment to adhere to the peace agreement.66 
61 Bellamy, Williams and Griffith, Understanding Peacekeeping. 
62 Bellamy, Williams and Griffith, Understanding Peacekeeping; Cilliers and Malan, Peacekeeping in the DRe; 
Williams, "lessons Unlearned." 
63 Bellamy, Williams and Griffith, Understanding Peacekeeping. 
64 Bellamy, Williams and Griffith, Understanding Peacekeeping. 
65 Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security 22, 2 (1997); 8. 
66 Bellamy, Williams and Griffith, Understanding Peacekeeping. 
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Williams argues that the combination of complex conflicts, problematic agreements, a large 
number of parties and armed belligerents, 'leave peacekeepers operating in zones where 
the occurrence of warfare is a constant threat,.67 He highlights that there is considerable risk 
of sending peacekeepers to zones where there is no peace to keep. He also lists factors, 
endogenous and exogenous to the peacekeeping operation, that affect peacekeepers 
capabilities to keep the peace. The list includes complex mandates, an insufficient number 
of troops and police, an insufficient number of Western or well-trained troops, and, lastly, 
what he terms 'too many' bad peacekeepers.68 He uses different cases to illustrate his 
respective points, some of which include MONUC peacekeeping. 
The existence of spoilers in a complex conflict is, for many authors, the preferred 
explanation for MONUC's failures in the ORe. However, the studies rarely point out how 
MONUC managed the problems that were not of its own making. 
2.3 Responding to MONUC's Failures 
Much of the literature on MONUC's failures identifies lessons to be learnt; prescribes 
solutions and policy; and/or recommends strategies. 
Many studies of UN peace operations analyse peacekeeping operations in order to learn 
'lessons'; for example, Bellamy et al; Patrick C. Cammaert; Lise Moje Howard; Malan and 
Porto; and William Lacy Swing. Even UN reports such as the Brahimi Report of 2000, 'A New 
Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping Report', were written 
with this perspective in mind.69 Most of this literature, particularly that on MONUC from 
67 Williams, "Peace Operations in Africa." 
68 Bellamy, Williams and Griffith, Understanding Peacekeeping. 
69 Patrick C. Cammaert, "learning to Use force in the Hoof of Peacekeeping: Reflections on the Experience of 
MON UC s Eastern Division," Institute for Security Studies Situation Report (2007), 
http://dspace.cigilibrarv.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/31147/1/SWING%20SITREP[91.pdf?1 (accessed 
February 2,2012); Patrick C. Cammaert, "A Peacekeeping Commander's Perspective: From Headquarters and 
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Cammaert and Swing, highlights the need to learn from its use of force; resolve problems 
relating to the protection of civilians; how to deal with logistical and tactical issues; coping 
with shortages of financial resources; the quality and quantity of the troops; accountability 
issues; communication and decision making measures; mandates; and international and 
regional support. 
Many authors propose policies or recommend strategies.7o For instance, Autesserre; 
Boulden; Virgil Hawkins; and Rogier's recommendations include: increasing MONUC's 
resources; strengthening its mandate by giving it the capabilities it needed to address the 
flaws within the agreement; dealing with the causes of the continuing instability and the 
lack of commitment from signatories; improving the UN's policy regarding the protection of 
civilians; and transforming its implementation strategies.71 The bulk of the policy and 
strategic recommendations offered in respect of MONUC pertain to the misconduct of the 
peacekeepers. Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur; Max Du Plessis and 
Stephen Pete; Lauren Hunter; Vanessa Kent; Ray Murphy; and Susan Notar are relevant 
authors.72 These recommendations included improving training; increasing accountability 
measures; and ensuring peacekeepers' liability for the crimes they committed. 
the Field," The RUSI Journal 153,3 (2008); Howard, UN Peacekeeping; Malan and Porto, Challenges of Peace 
Implementation; William Lacy Swing, "The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUC): lessons learnt," Institute for Security Studies Situation Report (2007). 
http://dspace.cigilibrarv.org/lspui/bltstream/123456789/3114711/SWING%20SITREP[91.pdf?1 (accessed 
February 6, 2012); United Nations, ItBrahimi Report: Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of 
Peacekeeping Operations in All their Aspects (2000)," http://www.un.org!peace/reports/peace operationsl 
(accessed July 16, 2011); United Nations Department of Peacekeeping-and Department of Field Support, A 
New Partnership Agenda Report: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (2009), 
htto:llwww.un.org!enlpeacekeeping!documents/newhorizon.pdf (accessed February 2, 2012). 
70 Fortna and Howard, "Pitfalls and Prospects," 288. 
71 Autesserre endorses adopting micro-level peacekeeping and peacebuilding, while Tom Woodhouse 
sanctions identifying culture and using it to promote peace and stability. Autesserre, The Trouble with the 
Congo: Local, 41-125; Virgil Hawkins, "History Repeating Itself: The DRC and the LIN Security Council," Institute 
for Security Studies African Security Review 12, 4 (2003): 50-51; Woodhouse, "Peacekeeping, Peace Culture," 
486. 
72 Aoi, Coning and Thakur, Unintended Consequences, 16-17; Max Du Plessis and Stephen Pete, "Who Guards 
the Guards? The ICC and Serious Crimes Committed by United Nations Peacekeepers in Africa, II African 
Security Review 13, 4 (2004): 5-17; Vanessa Kent, "Protecting Civilians from UN Peacekeepers and 
Humanitarian Workers: Sexual ExplOitation and Abuse," in Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping, eds. 
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The peacekeeping literature's focus on lessons to learn and policy and strategic 
recommendations is revealing. The problem with these perspectives, however, is that they 
fail to recognise that some of MONUC's failures originate in the normative underpinnings of 
the United Nations.73 Most of the solutions put forward might solve the problems in the 
short-term, but the same problems could re-surface in other operations because of the way 
that the UN is constituted and functions. This has been recognised by some authors: Roland 
Paris; Bellamy; and Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham all suggest that the focus on 
policy relevance, strategies recommendations and lessons learnt fails 'to address the more 
fundamental critiques of peacekeeping pitched at the meta-theoretical level' .74 
2.4 Conclusion 
Critics of MONUC often direct their studies to the identification of the failures of the 
mission. These failures were frequently attributed to weak mandates; the methods of their 
implementation; logistical issues, troop and financial shortages; the weaknesses of peace 
agreements; and the misconduct of peacekeepers. The studies' explanations of these 
failures are useful but limited. We do not often get to read of MONUC's ability to achieve 
prioritised objectives. Similarly, the MONUC critiques might be, simply, the result not of 
conditions in the ORC but consequences of the nature of the UN. Any literature concerned 
with only 'establishing instrumental practices to address pre-existing problems,75 or 'policy 
relevance' or the goal of offering advice and recommendations to policy makers,76 is unlikely 
to see this. 
Chiyuki AOi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2007), 53; Murphy, "An 
Assessment of UN Efforts," 531-546; Susan A. Notar, "Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse of Women and Children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," American University Journal of 
Gender, Social Policy and Law 14 (2006): 413-430. 
73 Bellamy, "The 'Next Stage'," 1; Paris, "Broadening the Study," 28; Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, 
"Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and the Globalization of Security," International Peacekeeping 12, 2 (2005): 139-
156. 
74 Bellamy, "The 'Next Stage'," 1; Paris, "Broadening the Study," 28; Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 
"Cosmopolitan Peacekeepin& II 139-156. 
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This dissertation intends to expand the scope of inquiry on MONUC. Before it can 
accomplish that aim, however, a brief background to and description of the UN in the Congo 
and the 1998 Congolese conflict and its effects is required. This follows in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: The DRC. the 1998 Conflict and the United Nations in the DRC 
3.1 Introduction 
The 1998 conflict has been described as 'Africa's First World War' because of its complex 
intra-state andinter-state, regional, national and local characteristics.77 This chapter briefly 
outlines the background of this war along three lines: the main causes of the war; the 
peacemaking; and the context of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo's (MONUC) involvement. 
3.2 The 1998 DRe Conflict 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formally Zaire, is located in the heart of central 
Africa, bordered by Angola; Burundi; Central African Republic; the Republic of the Congo 
(Brazzaville); Rwanda; Sudan; Tanzania; Uganda; and Zambia. It is physically the third largest 
country in Africa; has an estimated population of 70.9 million as of 2011; and consists of 
over 200 African ethnic groups?8 After obtaining its independence from Belgium In 1960, 
the DRC suffered from instability and fighting until 1965, when the former President Joseph 
Mobutu Sese Seko took control of the country, which he renamed Zaire. Under Mobutu's 32 
years of dictatorship, from 1965 to 1997, the country's economy dwindled, poverty 
escalated, and infrastructure and service provision wasted away?9 By 1996 the DRC was in a 
dire position because of Mobutu and his corrupt government's behaviour. Conflict broke 
out from 1996 to 1997. This 'First DRC War' was conceived as a 'civil war against 
n Term first used by Susan Rice, US Assistant Secretary of State. Filip Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo 
and Regional Geopolitics, 1996 - 2006 (New York: Cambridge, 2009), 194. 
78 Central Intelligence Agency (OA) - The World Factbook, "Africa: Congo, Democratic Republic of the, " 
https:llwww.da.gov/librarv/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos!countrvtemplatecg.html(accessed 
January 18, 2011). 
79 Thomas Turner, Congo Wars: Con/lict, Myth, Reality (london: Zed Books, 2007), 2. 
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dictatorship, rather than international war.so Mobutu's dictatorship rule ended in May 
1997, when he was overthrown by Laurent Desire Kabila and his party, the Allied 
Democratic Forces for the liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFl), with - crucially - the support of 
Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. 
After Kabila's takeover, many hoped for a different form of leadership from that of Mobutu. 
Kablla failed to accommodate 'internal democratic forces that had struggled against Mobutu 
for a long time', and was also unable 'to aggregate, reconcile and respond to various 
interests in the coalition that overthrew the Mobutu regime and brought the AFDL into 
pOWer.81 Kabila's inability to respond to these interests negatively affected his relations 
with neighbouring states and internal factions. By 1998 Kabila was no longer seen as a 
liberator but rather a corrupt, greedy and nepotistic leader.82 In August of 1998, an attempt 
was made to overthrow Kabila by internal factions, such as the Congolese Rally for 
Democracy (RCD)83 and the Congo Liberation Movement (MlC), together with neighbouring 
state support from Rwanda and Uganda.84 Neighbouring countries had expected to benefit 
from the Kabila government. Rwanda and Uganda in particular, had already become very 
disappointed by Kabila's security policies. 
Kabila responded by requesting assistance from the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). SADC's response was divided, with Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
pursuing a militaristic operation to protect Kabila's presidency and Botswana, lesotho and 
South Africa8S pursuing a peacemaking solution. Kabila opted for military support from 
SADC, leading Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe to become directly involved in the conflict. 
This was the beginning of the 1998 DRC conflict that came to be known as the 'Second 
80 Turner, Congo Wars, 2. 
81 Mwesiga Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Harare: SAPES Books, 1999), Hi. 
82 Reyntjens, The Great African War, 194. 
83 RCO later broke off into two factions, RCO-Goma supported by Rwanda and RCO-Kisangani supported by 
Uganda. 
84 Reyntjens, The Great African War, 194. 
as South Africa also had the support of Mauritius, Seychelles and Swaziland. 
32 
Congo War' or 'Africa's First World War'.S6 Overall, the war involved at least twelve armed 
rebel groups and nine African countries including Chad, Libya and Sudan. 
Some of the salient features of this conflict - that would affect MONUC - include the 1994 
Rwandan genocide; the presence of multiple rebel groups; natural resources; land; and 
questions over citizenship and identity. 
3.2.2 The Rwandan Genocide 
The 1994 Rwandan genocide is a key factor that contributed to the 1998 Congolese conflict. 
After the genocide and overthrow of the Rwandan government by the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) in 1994, masses of refugees, consisting of Hutu citizens, Interhamwe militias and 
ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) members, fled Rwanda. These refugees settled along the 
Burundian, ORC and Tanzanian borders. Some refugee camps were converted into 
'organised systems of mass mobilisation for a political purpose ... under the authority of their 
former [ex-FAR and Interhamwe] leaders, ready to be used for further aims' against the 
Tutsis in Rwanda.s7 The exclusion of the ex-FAR and Interhamwe from the peace process in 
the ORC, and the unresolved refugee crisis, resulted in rebel and civilian clashes that 
contributed to continued instability and fighting in the country. 
From the ORC border, raids and armed intrusions into Rwanda became the Hutu militias' 
regular conduct. These led to an eruption of violence along the border between the 
Rwandan People's Army (RPA) and Hutu militias based in the ORe. In retaliation, Rwanda 
supported Kabila in 1996 in order to protect its border from these raids. The rupture of 
86 Reyntjens, The Great African War, 194. The Second Congo War is also known as the 'War of Occupation'. 
87 Gerard Prunier, From Genocide to Continental War: The 'Congolese' Conflict and the Crisis 0/ Contemporary 
Africa (london: Hurst, 2009), 24. 
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Kabila and Rwanda's relations in 1998 came when 'the AFDL leadership felt a growing need 
to distance itself from [Rwanda in order] ... to build for itself a domestic political power 
base,.88 The Rwandan government's concern over its border security, in turn, led it to 
support DRC rebels, such as the RCD-Goma faction.89 
Uganda, like Rwanda, 
justified its intervention by claiming that it [was] concerned about security 
threats emanating from Sudanese supported rebels, the Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).90 
Rwanda and Uganda's undertakings directly contributed to the occurrence of the 1998 DRC 
conflict through their direct participation and involvement in supporting rebel factions. The 
two countries continued to support rebel groups in the Congo even after the official end of 
the war in 1999. The countries' continued participation in the Congo, particularly during 
Phase I and II of MONUC's operation,91 made it difficult for the mission to implement 
respective peace agreements and address the fighting in the country. 
3.2.3 Rebel Groups 
The DRC has been plagued with numerous rebel groups, militias and smaller armed groups. 
These armed non-state groups 
88 Koen Vlassenroot and Chris Huggins, "land, Migration and Conflict in Eastern DRC," in From the Ground Up, 
Jenny Clover, Chris Huggins, Prisca Kamungi-Mulemi, Herman Musaraha, Benson M. Ochieng, Johnstone S. 
Oketch, Johan Pottier and Koen Vlassenroot (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 149. 
89 lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence, 223. 
90 International Crisis Group, "The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis 
of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace," 13, http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/africa/central-
africa/dr-
congo/Democratic%20Republic%200f%20Congo%20An%20Analysis%200f%2Othe%20Agreement%20and%20P 
rospects%20for%20Peace.ashx (accessed July 20, 2011). 
91 From 1999 - 2001. 
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range from armed bandits, vigilantes, cultist groups, private security 
companies, criminal bands, community/ethnic/religious/regional armies, 
armed wings of political parties and private armies to militias, Islamist 
militants and rebel groups.92 
The list includes groups such as: 
• the National Council for the Defence of Democracy/Forces for the Defence of 
Democracy (CNDD/FDD); 
• the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP); 
• Front for the Integration and Peace in Ituri (FIPI); 
• the Nationalist and Integrationist Front/Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri 
(FNI/FRPI); 
• the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA); 
• Mai Mai militias; 
• the Congo Liberation Movement (MLC); 
• Patriots in the Congolese Resistance (PARECO); 
• the Party for the Safeguarding of the Congo (PUSIC); 
• the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD); 
• RCD-Goma; 
• RCD-Kisangani; 
• RCD-Movement for Liberation (M L); 
• RCD-National; and 
• the Uganda's People's Congress (UPC). 
This list ofthe rebel groups and armed actors in the Congo is not exhaustive.93 
92 Augustine Ikelegbe and Wafula Okumu, "Introduction: Towards Conceptualisation and Understanding of the 
Threats of Armed Non-state Groups to Human Security and the State in Africa," in Militias, Rebels and Islamist 
Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa, eds. Augustine Ikelegbe and Wafula Okumu (Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 1. 
93 Phillip Kasaija, "Rebels and Militias in Resource Conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo," in 
Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa, eds. Augustine Ikelegbe and 
Wafula Okumu (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 194-196. 
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Most of the rebel groups in the Congo were formed with the intention of addressing specific 
issues. For example, PARECO, consisting of former Mai Mai members, was formed to fight 
FDlR opposition rebel groups in eastern Congo in 2007.94 PARECO collaborated with the 
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDe) to fight against the CNDP in 
2008.95 Despite their reasons for their formation, rebel groups such as PARECO sometimes 
continued fighting outside their original purpose in order to benefrt from opportunities 
present in the congo.96 
Some of the rebel groups were supported by Rwanda, Uganda or the DRC government. 
These groups had an 'interest in the initiation, perpetuation, and renewal of conflict' 
because they 'did well out of war,.97 Their opportunistic activities were extensive, ranging 
from theft, illegal arms trade, primary commodity trading, any form of rent-seeking trading, 
illegal resource explOitation, to political recognition and seeking appointment to leadership 
positions.98 In cases where armed non-state actors benefit from profitable opportunities, 
peaceful settlements of disputes were less likely to be successful as the rebel groups found 
no opportunities, incentive or benefit from the agreement.99 As a result of these 
opportunities, MONUC's operation faced fighting and attacks from rebel groups, particularly 
in the east. 
3.2.4 Natural Resources 
The Congo is rich in natural resources such as coal, copper, diamonds, gold, hydropower, 
petroleum, silver, uranium, timber and more.1OO Despite the country's abundant natural 
94 Kasaija, "'Rebels and militias," 193. 
9S Kasalja, NRebels and militias, N 193. 
96 Paul Collier, NDolng Well out of War: An Economic Perspective, II in Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas 
in Ov/I Wars, eds. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 110. 
97 Collier, "Doing Well out of War," 110. 
98 Collier, "Doing Well out ofWar,N 103-104. 
99 Collier, IIDolng Well out of War," 103-104. 
100 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - The World Factbook, It Africa: Congo." 
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resources, it is one of the most poorly economically developed countries on the continent, 
and its economic situation worsened with the conflict.lOl State weakness and insufficient 
border control has made the illegal exploitation and export of these resources easy.lOl Mass 
looting by Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and rebels groups occurred even prior to the 1998 ORe 
conflict. These resources were being used by the countries and rebel groups to fund their 
insurgency activities and accumulate wealth. lo3 Laurent Desire Kabila/s takeover in 1997 and 
his subsequent disruption of relations with Rwanda threatened access to these resources. 
Rebel groups consider the access to and exploitation of resources important because they 
provide them with the funds necessary to make them wealthy and maintain their 
organisations.104 These reasons provide a greater incentive to continue fighting than any 
other motivations. lOS The 1998 insurgency provided an opportunity for these groups to 
maintain and gain access to these resources. The rebels' desire for easy access to 
unregulated natural resources also contributed to the occurrence of violent attacks during 
MONUCs mission.106 
101 Rob Quinn, "The Congo War: Economic Causes and Consequences,s Student Economic Review 21 (2007): 
201. 
102 Turner, Congo Wars, 10-11. 
103 United Nations, "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo (2001)," 
http://wWw.un.org!News/dhllatest/drcongo.htm (accessed October 5, 2010). 
104 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffier, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Centre for the Study of African 
Economies (CSAE), WPS/2OO2-01 (2001), http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingDapers/pdfs/2002-0ltext.pdf 
(accessed January 29, 2011). 
105 Collier and Hoeffier, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), 1. 
106 Luke Moffet, "Ending the Cycle of Violence in the Congo: Is Peace Possible in the Heart of Darkness?" 
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3.2.5 The Land 
Land is in short supply in the eastern Congo: clashes rooted in this scarcity contributed to 
the occurrence ofthe 1998 conflict. lo7 The ORC is rich in fertile land; yet ofthe '120 million 
hectares of fertile land ... only 2%' was cultivated by 2009, the cultivated area being primarily 
(but not exclusively) located in the eastern part of the ORe.108 A large area of the central 
land mass in the country Is covered by dense tropical rain forest, making it difficult for the 
land to be productively utilised. 109 
Population density is a further complicating factor. The eastern Congo is a densely 
populated area for two reasons. Firstly, the east's fertile cultivatable land attracted large 
numbers of Congolese people.110 Secondly, refugees from bordering countries have settled 
in the eastern ORe.lll The refugee presence caused problems over land ownership in the 
ORe. As Prunier suggests: 
the evolution from traditional patterns of land control to modern systems of 
land ownership had been accompanied by swindling and manipulation on the 
part of some of the Kinyarwanda-speaking populations who took advantage 
of their close relationship with the Mobutu regime.1l2 
Controversy over ownership of pastoral and agricultural land intensified into violent 
clashes that led to the 1998 conflict during the senior Kabila's regime.1l3 
107 Mahmood Mamdani, "Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of 
Colonialism,H Comparative Studies in Society and History 43,4 (2001): 659; Mahmood Mamdani, "African 
States, Citizenship and War: A Case-study," International Affairs 78, 3 (2002): 503. 
108 All Africa.Com, "Africa: ORC Hands SA Farmers Access to Land," 
http://allafrica.com/stories/2oo910220529.html(accessed January 18, 2011). 
109 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - The World Factbook, "Africa: Congo." 
110 Vlassenroot and Huggins, "Land, Migration and Conflict," 147. 
111 Vlassenroot and Huggins, "Land, Migration and Conflict," 147. 
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Land distribution issues and the refugee crisis in the east were very much a problem in the 
DRC during MONUCs operatlon.114 For example, in Masisi and Walikale In North Kivu from 
2003, land allocations originating from the Belgian colonial period fuelled fighting amongst 
'the Congolese of Rwandan descent, especially the Tutsis among them, [who] own most of 
the land,.l1s The problem lay with the Hundes and the Nyangas who continued to claim that 
the land was their own, based on ancestral ownership patterns. These continuous battles 
resulted in the exodus of numerous Congolese Rwandan refugees fleeing the fighting over 
the land. 
3.2.6 Questions over Citizenship and Identity 
Concerns originating from the Congo's colonial period over citizenship and identity 
contributed to the occurrence of the 1998 war and fighting during MONUCs mission. During 
the country's colonial period, the Belgians created a 'native policy' to manage their 
territory.116 This 'native policy' entailed 'schools for sons of chiefs' [that] provided the 
necessary skills to the new generation of literate chiefs, who would serve as intermediaries 
between the colonial administration and the African masses'.117 Furthermore, this policy 
entrenched the Congolese peoples' ethnic differences and leadership roles were allocated in 
a manner that favoured Hutus over Tutsis.118 The Belgians exported this policy into Ruanda-
Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi).119 Belgium's abrupt withdrawal from the Congo and Rwanda 
at independence in 1960 resulted in ethnic clashes over land ownership, leadership and 
identity in the countries.120 These clashes led to large numbers of refugee flows between 
Burundi, Congo and Rwanda. 
114 Moffett, "Ending the Cycle of Violence in the Congo," 9. 
115 Severine Autesserre, "The Trouble with the Congo: How local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict,» Foreign 
Affairs 87, 3, (2008): 96. 
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2003),221. 
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Given that the Banyarwanda are 'East Africa's largest ethnic group'J121 the ethnic 
populations living in the Great Lakes region are posed with a constant ethnic security 
dilemma.122 An ethnic security dilemma is a condition in which there is 'emerging 
anarchy123 brought on by state weakness,124 historical events, and 'collective fears of the 
future' and it is under this condition that ethnic communities 'invest in and prepare for 
violence', and, in doing so, 'make actual violence possible,.l25 The dilemma exists in that 
'what one does to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make 
one less secure,.126 Ethnic groups in the Congo, such as the Banyarwanda, were faced with 
such a security dilemma. 
Contentions surrounding the issues of identity and ethnicity were compounded during' 
President Mobutu's rule as ethnic identities and citizenship were manipulated as a political 
tool. These contentions related to the identity and citizenship of the Banyarwanda127 who 
had settled in the ORC before 1959. Mobutu implemented the 1972 decree that 'granted 
citizenship to 1959 refugees', only to overturn this law with a 1981 law that 'emphasized 
ancestry over residence' .128 These laws were reversed again during 
the Congolese national conference, [when} the gathering of the political and 
civil opposition to Mobutu, met to consider the citizenship question in 1991, 
121 Mamdanl, "African States, II 494. 
122 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's study of the causes of civil war revealed 'that societies characterised by 
'ethnic dominance', i.e., where one ethnic group makes up 45 - 90 percent of the population, have a 
systematically higher risk of civil war'. For a detailed discussion see Collier and Hoeffier, Centre for the Study of 
African Economies (CSAE). 
123 Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic conflict/, in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. 
Michael E. Brown (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 103. 
124 The state becomes weak when it loses its 'ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credible 
guarantees of protection for groups'. David A. lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fears: The Origin and 
Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, 2 (1996): 43. 
125 Posen, lithe Security Dilemma/' 103. 
126 Posen, "The Security Dilemma/, 104. 
127 Banyarwandans consist ofthree groups: the Banyarutshuru, who 'have been considered indigenous to 
Congo, the Banyamasisi and Banyamulenge who are not'. Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
59-60; Mamdani, N African States, II 501. 
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they too passed a law confirming Mobutu's 1981 law emphasizing ancestry 
over residence as the basis of citizenship.129 
Confusion and speculation over the Banyarwanda identity often led to protests and violent 
clashes amongst Congolese inhabitants. Laurent Desire Kabila, like Mobutu, used ethnic 
identities as a political tool and caused some controversy by raising the issue of citizenship 
during his presidency.130 This led to resentment and clashes against Rwandan refugees and 
the Banyarwanda. 
3.3 Peacemaking 
Soon after the start of the 1998 conflict, peacemaking efforts were initiated. These led to 
the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999); the Agreement between the Rwanda and the 
Kinshasa Government (the Pretoria Accord of 2002); the Agreement between the DRC and 
Uganda (the Luanda Agreement of 2002); the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement and Final 
Act of Endorsement, often known as the Sun City Agreement (2003); and agreements about 
security sector reform. 
The signing of the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement brought a ray of hope for the Congo. 
The ceasefire agreement endorsed the 'cessation of hostilities pending a political 
settlement' through an Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD).131 MONUC initiated its peacekeeping 
operation on 30 November 1999, yet violence, Instability and Insecurity persisted in the 
country. Multiple attempts were made to resolve the continued instability and violence in 
the country.' Kabila, however, was particularly difficult during negotiations and was criticised 
for staling the ICD process.132 In 2001, Laurent Desire Kabila was assassinated by his 
129 Mamdani, "African States," 503. 
130 Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 25-28; Mamdani, n African States," 503, 
131 International Crisis Group, "The Agreement on a Cease-Fire. II 
132 International Crisis Group, "The Agreement on a Cease-Fire," 
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bodyguard. laurent Desire Kabila's son, Joseph Kabila, succeeded him as President of the 
ORe. After Joseph Kabila's appointment negotiations proceeded more smoothly. 
The Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM), tan agreement designed to address cross-border 
issues, specifically to deal with the threats of the Interhamwe and ex-Rwandan Armed 
Forces (FAR), groups responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda' was signed by Rwanda 
and the ORC in 2002.133 This agreement officially ended the feud between the ORC and 
Rwanda which led to the minor improvement of border security between the two countries. 
The luanda Agreement, signed on 6 September 2002, was an agreement on the withdrawal 
of troops from the Congo between the ORC and Uganda.134 This saw the official withdrawal 
of Ugandan troops from the Congo in 2003. Despite the withdrawal of foreign troops, 
clashes between the ORC government and rebel groups and opposition parties, particularly 
those in the Kivus, continued. 
South Africa successfully brokered the Sun City All-Inclusive Agreement in 2002. The Sun 
City All-Inclusive Agreement, first formalised in July 2002 and signed on 19 December 2002, 
was part of the ICO aimed at resolving the crisis in the Congo. The Sun City All-Inclusive 
Agreement called for the formation of ta transitional government headed by President 
Kabila and four vice presidents', the formation of an integrated and newly restructured 
national army, the disarming of militias and rebel groups, and the withdrawal of foreign 
troops.135 This agreement was signed by tthe Government of the ORC, the RCO, the 
133 Ted Dagne, "The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments," 
httD:/Iwww.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40108.Ddf(accessed January 27, 2011). 
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Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), the political opposition, civil society, the 
Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), the Congolese Rally for 
Democracy-National (RCD-N) and the Mai-Mai,.136 The Agreement called for 'a transitional 
government headed by President Kabila and four vice presidents and in July 2003, the four 
vice presidents were sworn in,/37 elections were held in 2006 and a democratically elected 
government was instituted.138 
Unfortunately, the elections did not have a lasting effect on the country's stability. This 
instability was partly rooted in clashes that had begun in 2004. There was a serious outbreak 
of violence in the North Kivu in 2004 when Laurent Nkunda139 and his CNDP troops clashed 
with the transitional government's army, FAROe. These clashes continued over the years 
with Nkunda refusing to recognise the election results and the government.l40 The Goma 
deal was signed to end these clashes between the government and Nkunda's factions in 
2008. Regardless of this, violence was rampant in the Kivus. Nkunda was later arrested in 
2009 in Rwanda but, despite his arrest, his supporters continued to attack civilians in the 
eastern provinces. 
3.4 The United Nations in the ORe 
Soon after the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999, the UN launched its 
peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, named MONUe. MONUC 
initially functioned as a small liaison force and later as a bigger force to implement the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. 
136 Dagne, "The Democratic Republic of Congo."; Relief Web, "Democratic Republic of the Congo (the)." 
137 Dagne, ''The Democratic Republic of Congo." 
138 Moffett, HEnding the Cycle of Violence in the Congo," 7. 
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the Defence of the people (CNDP). 
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3.4.1 MONUC's Mandate 
MONUC's mission was implemented in phases for two reasons. Firstly, the former Secretary 
General ofthe UN, Kofi Annan, recognised the precariousness ofthe political situation in the 
Congo, as well as the difficulties posed by the country's geographical size and features. 141 
Thus, the mission was thought better to be implemented on a piecemeal basis. Secondly, 
concerns over financial contributions, and thus, available resources, also suggested a phased 
peacekeeping operation in the DRC.142 
The MONUC mission was indeed implemented in four phases: 
Phase I (November 1999 to February 2000) entailed the deployment of civilian liaison 
officers accompanied by 500 military personnel.143 At this stage, MONUC was essentially an 
observer mission under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Under this Chapter, the observer 
mission focused on providing information that assisted the UN in determining 
recommendations on how to address the instability in the Congo. l44 The MONUC operation 
began in February 2000 following the authorisation of the UN liaison/observer mission in 
August 1999.145 MONUC was deployed under a mandate consistent with United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1258 (1999), 1273 (1999) and 1291 (2000) that called 
141 United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preliminary Deployment in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo S/1999/790 (1999)," 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view doc.asp?svmbol=S/19991790 (accessed March 28, 2011); United Nations, 
"United Nations Security Council Resolution 1279 S/RES/1279 (1999)/ 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=S/RESI1279%281999%29 (accessed February 2,2011). 
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143 Mark Malan and Henri Boshoff, "A 90-Day Plan to Bring Peace to the DRC? An Analysis of the Pretoria 
Agreement of 30 July 2002," Institute for Security Studies 61 (2002): 5; United Nations, "Report of the 
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MONUC to collect information and monitor signatories' adherence to the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement.146 
For Phase II (February 2000 to November 2001) MONUC had a similar mandate to that of 
Phase I, in that the mission recorded information and respective findings whilst 
implementing the Luanda and Sun City Agreements. The operation also monitored the 
implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and expanded to include 5 537 military 
personnel. But Phase II was authorised under Chapter VII ofthe UN Charter, which gave the 
military personnel authority to take necessary action against civilian attacks and instances of 
aggression.147 
Phase III (November 2001 to December 2006) ,entailed the deployment of an increased 
number of military personnel implementing the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, 
resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) programme and assisting with the Presidential and 
National Assembly election process in the Congo.148 In 2003, MONUC's troops were 
increased to approximately 10 800 and its budget increased to almost US$ 670 million. 
MONUC remained under the ambit of Chapter VII during this phase. The mission's force was 
increased by an additional 5 900 personnel in October 2004 and, as Table 3.1 shows, its 
budget also increased to an estimated US$ 941 000. 
146 United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1279." 
147 United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1291 S/RES/1291 (2000)," 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1291%282oo0%29 (accessed March 28, 2011). 
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I.~;", 
Table 3.1. MONUC's Expenditure from 1999 - 2010 
Period Amount: (Thousands of US$) 
1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010: 1351539 (estimated) 
1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009: 1222639 
1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008: 1129624 
1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007: 1135261 
1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006: 1078498 
1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005: 940946 
1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004: 665059 
1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003: 508122 
1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002: 401302 
1 July 2000 to 30 June 2001: 246472 
6 August 1999 to 30 June 2000: 55271 
Estimated Total: US$ 8.73 billion 
Source: United Nations, "MONUC, United Nations Organisation Mission In the Democratic Republic of 
Congo: MONUC Facts and Figures," httD:/Iwww.un.org!en/Deacekeeping!mlssions/monuc/facts.shtml (accessed June 1, 2011). 
Note: These funds exclude donations and contributions used for spedfic functions such as those made available by the EU for the election 
process. 
MONUC shifted its attention from 2005 to addressing and implementing preparations for 
the elections in the Congo. The elections were held on 30 July 2006, and the follow up 
presidential run-off election on 29 October 2006. MONUC also focused on ensuring that the 
environment in the DRC remained stable conducive for the successful execution of the 
election process. 
The finanCial contribution to MONUC for the election process increased from June 2005 to 
July 2006. During this time, the EU collaborated with the UN under the framework of the 
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European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to form the temporary European Union Force 
in the DRC (EUFOR RD Congo) military support operation for MONUC. • 
Phase IV (December 2006 to June 2010) involved the implementation of subsequent 
operation objectives such as security sector reform, civilian protection and conflict 
management in the eastern DRC.149 At its maximum strength, 'MONUC had 19815 military 
personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police, and 1 050 personnel of formed police 
units,.150 From 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010, the operation cost the UN approximately US$ 1 
350 billion, making it, at the time, the most expensive UN operation.151 MONUC's mandate 
centred on, amongst other aspects, the protection of civilians, the implementation of 
DDRRR programmes on local and foreign combatants, conflict management in the eastern 
part of the DRC, and training and collaborating with FARDC.152 
3.5 The Current Status in the DRC 
President Joseph Kabila requested the UN to withdraw its troops from the DRC and cease 
the MONUC operation in 2009. The UN accepted this request and began preparations for 
withdrawal, despite much criticism and discouragement from the international community 
as some feared that a withdrawal will throw the country back into a state of full-blown 
conflict.153 The international community argues that the UN's objectives and mandates are 
incomplete and the situation in the DRC is still too fragile to warrant a withdrawal.154 
149 Boshoff, "Overview of MONUC's Military Strategy," 137. 
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In accordance with the UNSCR 1925 passed in May 2010, the UN renamed MONUC to the 
United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) on 1 
July 2010.155 MONUC peacekeeping officially ended on this date. The operation was 
renamed MON USCO in order to adapt its capabilities to allow the mission to deal with the 
'new phase of peace and consolidation' in the DRC and an exit strategy for the UN.156 
Sporadic attacks are still occurring and the mass rape and assault of women and children are 
still prevalent in the country. To date, the UN is currently pursuing its MONUSCO objectives. 
MONUSCO's mandate has been extended until June 2012.157 
3.6 Conclusion 
The characteristics of the 1998 DRC conflict are rooted in the country's population; 
geopolitical characteristics; neighbours; and political dynamics. These combine to produce 
instability and violence, directly affecting MONUC's peacekeeping. Most of the violence and 
instability, further, would occur particularly in the east. Any consideration of MONUC's 
failures and successes is obliged to take the violent context of operations into account. The 
effects ranged from the need to protect MONUC's employees to dealing with groups who, 
facing predation, thought they had to defend themselves. To put it simply, the persistence 
of instability and violence limited what MONUC could achieve. An analysis of MONUC's 
mandates, objectives and accomplishments follows in the next chapter. 
1SS United Nations, "MONUSCO Mandate," 
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Chapter 4: MONUC's Mandates. Objectives and Accomplishments 1999 -
2010 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses MONUC's mandates and objectives in the periods 1999 to 2002; 2002 
to 2004; to 2004 to 2006; and 2007 to 2010. In each period, UN Security Council mandates 
are first, identified; second, objectives or the actual priorities in the mission mandates are 
identified; and third, the strengths and failures of the mission are discussed. 
4.2 MONUC 1999 - 2002 
4.2.1 Mandates 
The mandates assigned to MONUC during this period were through United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR), specifically UNSCR 1279 (1999); UNSCR 1291 (2000); UNSCR 
1341 (2001); UNSCR 1376 (2001); and UNSCR 1417 (2002).158 These called on MONUC: 
• to liaise and communicate with all the relevant signatories to the lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement; 
• to mo'nitor, observe and investigate that agreement and any subsequent violations 
of it; 
• to encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes; 
• to monitor the disengagement of troops in the Congo; 
• to organise and implement a mine action plan; and 
• 'to facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with particular 
attention to vulnerable groups including women, children and demobilized child 
soldiers' .159 
158 United Nations, "MONUC Mandate." 
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MONUC was mandated to work in cooperation with the Congo's Joint Military Commission 
(JMC) with implementing its resolutions at this stage. l60 
From November 1999 to February 2000, MONUC was classified as an observer mission 
under Chapter VI ofthe UN Charter. Chapter VI of the UN Charter on the Pacific Settlements 
of Disputes permitted MONUC to 'investigate any dispute, or any situation [in the Congo] 
which might lead to international friction or give rise to a disputeJ in order to determine 
whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security.161 At the same time, this chapter authorised the MONUC 
mission to encourage the settlement of disputes 'through negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, [through] regional agencies or arrangements, or 
other peaceful means,.162 In other words, MONUC's Chapter VI authority authorised the 
mission to engage in peacemaking. including monitoring the situation; acting to encourage 
the formation of new agreements that promote peace and security; and ensuring that 
actors adhere to existing peace agreements. 
In February 2000 MONUC's mandate expanded to include elements of Chapter VII authority. 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter is concerned with 'Action with Respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression'. Chapter VII permits a peace 
operation to take military action or use force when necessary to maintain peace and 
encourage stability and security in the Congo.163 UNSCR 1291 (20oo) mandate called 
MON UC to take necessary action 
159 United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1291." 
160 United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1291."; United Nations, "United Nations 
Documents on MONUC/' http:Uwww.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missionsfmonuc/resolutions.shtml (accessed 
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161 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 6." 
162 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 6.N 
163 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 6. H 
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in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within 
its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located Joint Military 
Commission (JMC) personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure 
the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence. l64 
The resolution allowed MONUC the authority for 'more robust' peacekeeping in instances of 
self-defence and protecting civilians.165 
There were two main problems with MONUC's mandates. 
Firstly, in Chapter VII MONUC, very early on in the operation, had the necessary authority to 
use force in self-defence and protecting civilians. But the mission's mandates lacked 
clarification as to the extent to which MONUC's Chapter VII authority could be 
implemented.166 MONUC was only permitted to implement components of Chapter VII 
authority, specifically using force to protect MONUC troops and in protecting civilians 'under 
imminent threat of physical violence,.167 This Chapter VII authorisation could be interpreted 
and implemented in any way by MONUC troops,168 
Secondly, there were too many different tasks simultaneously assigned to MONUC. These 
tasks ranged from monitoring, observing and investigating adherence to the lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement; monitoring the disengagement of troops in the Congo; protecting 
civilians 'under imminent threat of physical violence'; and other human rights monitoring. 
From almost the start of its mission, MONUC was in danger of being over extended. 
164 United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1291," 4. 
165 United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1291," 4. 
166 Clifford Bernath and Anne Edgerton, "MONUC: flawed mandate limits success," 
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/fileslreportsIMONUC May2003.pdf (accessed June 21, 2010). 
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4.2.2 MONUC's Objectives 
From 1999 to 2002 MONUC's primary objectives involved (a) assisting with the 
implementation of the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and (b) observing and monitoring. 
stability in the Congo. What did (b) entail? The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, signed by 
Angola, ORC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, called for the immediate cessation 
of hostilities within 24 hours of the signing of the agreement.169 MONUC was deployed as a 
liaison mission focusing on collecting information and monitoring adherence to this 
agreement.170 
The signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement resulted in tremendous optimism about the 
Congo's future. Unfortunately, violence continued; by late 2000 all the signatories to the 
agreement had violated the ceasefire in some respects. Non-compliance with the peace 
agreement continued until 2003, when another agreement, the Sun City All-Inclusive 
Agreement, was reached. MONUC's deployment in this unstable environment was 
considered problematic. This was because it is a 'well-known lesson that peacekeepers 
cannot function where there is no peace to keep. Missions [such as MONUCl keep being 
mounted in the Micawberesque belief that everything that can go right Will',171 which is 
hardly an ideal situation. 
Even so, MONUC continued with its tasks, because the UN considered the mission necessary 
for the stabilisation of the Congo: the operation and MONUC's presence would act as a 
deterrent against further fighting and violations of the ceasefire agreement.l72 In other 
words, without MONUC, things would be worse. This meant, however, that MONUC was 
169 United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 23 July 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Zambia 
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council S/1999/815 (1999)," 4, 
http://www.un.org/Docs/s815 25.pdf (accessed September 12, 2011). 
170 The mission started this function in February 2000. Malan and Boshoff, "A 9O-Day Plan/ 5; United Nations 
Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations S/1999/790 (1999)," 4. 
171 Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, eds., Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United 
Notions Peacekeeping (New York: International Peace Institute, 2009), 3 and 15; David M. Malone and Ramesh 
Thakur, HUN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned?" Global Governance 7, 1 (2001): 13. 
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more than observing, monitoring and implementing the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement - the 
primary reason why MONUC had been deployed in the first place. MONUC now had some 
entitlement to forcibly create peace, which is not a normal Chapter VI operation. MONUC 
was expected to do more than it was designed to do. 
4.2.3 MONUC's Implementation of Objectives 
Observing and Monitoring 
The mission's observer personnel were focused on monitoring, collecting and reporting 
relevant information in 1999. These officers, unfortunately, struggled to acquire relevant 
information because of continued violence, obstructions from the Congolese state and 
travel restrictions.173 This meant that MONUC had limited information as to the situation in 
the DRC thereby restricting its preparedness.174 
Protection of Civilians 
MONUC struggled to protect civilians, despite their authority to use force in doing so. For 
example, in May 2002 there were severe attacks against civilians in Kisangani by the 
Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)-Goma troops. The RCD-Goma troops maimed, injured 
and killed over 100 civilians in less than a week. l75 These attacks received little attention 
from MONUC's approximately 1000 military personnel stationed in that area, who were 
well aware of the events occurring at that time.176 It is said that MONUC chose not to act 
because the present MONUC deputy force commander Iwas unwilling to risk UN lives to 
173 United Nations, "Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preliminary Deployment in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo S/1999/1116 (1999'," 4, 
http://www.un.orglga/search/view doc.asp?svmbol=S/1999/1116 (accessed March 31, 2011). 
174 United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1291," 3-4. 
175 United Nations, "Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo S/2002/621 (2002)," 1, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view doc.aspi'symbol=S/2002/621 (accessed Septembe~ 20,2011). 
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curb the violence'.l77 MONUC did attempt to curb the attacks by having a meeting with the 
rebels from the RCD-Goma. The meeting occurred days after the attacks and only resulted in 
the 'protection of seven civilians and negotiations for the release of two missionaries. These 
achievements, however, paled in comparison to the loss of life and destruction the UN could 
have averted or at least mitigated,.178 
4.2.4 Conclusion 
MONUC achieved some success in monitoring adherence to the lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement. Observation and monitoring of the situation in the Congo by MONUC, however, 
was difficult to achieve because the continued Violence, obstructions from the Congolese 
state and travel restrictions imposed on the UN observer mission made it difficult for the 
mission to fully reach its potential as a monitoring mission. 
How MONUC interpreted its mandates was also a factor. MONUC was entitled to use force 
to protect civilians. Yet, during the 2002 Kisangani massacre, MONUC had approximately 
1000 military personnel stationed in the area, MONUC's deputy force commander's 
interpretation of the mandate and the situation on the ground, resulted in a feeble 
response when lives could have been saved. MONUC's commanders rather narrow 
interpretation of the mission's mandate, therefore, had a deleterious influence on the 
operation's implementation: clearly, the failure to protect civilians could not be attributed 
to a shortage of resources.179 
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